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Impact of Federal Marketing Orders on the Structure of Milk Markets in the United States
Tsunemasa Kawaguchi, Nobuhiro Suzuki, and Harry M. Kaiser^
The 1996 Farm Bill mandated a reduction in the number of federal milk marketing orders 
(FMMOs) in the United States (from 33 to between 10 and 14) through the merger and 
consolidation of existing orders. This change is supposed to be made by 1999. The drastic 
reduction in FMMOs will undoubtedly have major consequences for milk markets in the United 
States. Because the law calls for arguably the largest change in marketing orders since their 
inception in the 1930s, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and various university researchers are 
currently studying the potential economic impacts of FMMO mergers and consolidations. One 
of the key issues researchers are addressing is the appropriate structure for interregional milk 
pricing for the newly formed orders. In answering this question, it is useful to know the impact 
of current FMMOs on the structure of milk markets in the United States. •
FMMOs regulate the terms and conditions of Grade A milk (eligible for beverage 
consumption) sales in the United States. The main economic feature of FMMOs is classified 
pricing of milk, which price discriminates milk according to how the milk is used. Milk used in 
beverage products, or Class I products (the most price inelastic of all dairy products), receives a 
price premium (Class I differential), while milk going into more price elastic manufactured 
products (Classes II, III, and Ilia) receives lower prices (see discussion below). FMMOs may 
provide market power to farmers or their cooperatives to counterbalance the market power of 
fluid milk processors. The degree of market power created can be measured by the size of the 
Class I differential created by orders.
All previous studies on FMMOs and the structure of interregional milk pricing in the 
United States have used Takayama and Judge-type spatial equilibrium models (e.g., Cox, 
Chavas, and Jesse; McDowell, Fleming, and Spinelli; Novakovic and Pratt). These models are 
used to determine optimal levels of milk shipments among regions in the United States, as well
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as shadow prices on the value of milk for each region, which is useful information for evaluating 
regional Class I price surfaces. A potential drawback of these models, however, is the 
assumption that markets are perfectly competitive. In reality, the structure of U.S. milk markets 
may be better characterized as imperfectly competitive due to the existence of large and 
dominant dairy cooperatives, milk processors, and retail supermarket chains, as well as the 
influence of FMMOs. Therefore, a more generalized spatial equilibrium model that can impose 
any degree of market structure would be beneficial.
In this paper, we develop a spatial equilibrium model that allows for the inclusion of any 
degree of market structure from perfect competition to monopoly. To our knowledge, the only 
other spatial equilibrium model allowing for any degree of market structure is a recent one 
developed by Kawaguchi, Suzuki, and Kaiser to study the Japanese milk market structure. No 
similar spatial study has been conducted for U.S. milk markets. Since FMMOs may give some 
market-power-equivalent to dairy cooperatives by setting minimum Class I price differentials, 
the model is used to investigate the impact of milk marketing orders on market structure. To 
determine what degree of market-power-equivalent is created by the current orders, we simulate 
possible Class I and manufacturing milk prices which could be created by dairy cooperatives 
without the FMMO system, under alternative assumed market structures. The simulation results 
are then compared with current regional milk prices under the FMMO system to gain insight on 
the impact of orders on market structure.
FMMO Pricing and Simplifying Assumptions
FMMOs generally classify milk into four uses: Class I (milk used in beverage products), Class II 
(milk used in soft manufactured products), Class III (milk used in hard dairy products), and Class 
Ilia (milk used in nonfat dry milk). The Class III price is the base for milk pricing under the 
FMMO system. For almost all marketing orders, the Class III price is equal to the Basic Formula 
Price calculated from the Minnesota-Wisconsin (MW) price, which is the actual price paid for 
manufacturing grade (Grade B) milk in these two states. While FMMOs apply only to Grade A 
milk, Grade B milk prices are used as the pricing base since the manufactured product market is 
national in scope, and therefore Grade A milk processed into manufactured products competes 
with Grade B milk in Wisconsin and Minnesota. Some marketing orders have a Class Ilia price
for nonfat dry milk, which is usually lower than the Class III price. The Class II milk price for 
soft dairy products is about 30 cents higher than the Class III price. While these class prices are 
the minimum prices regulated handlers must pay farmers, the actual manufacturing milk prices 
are often higher in some orders because of over-order payments.
In the model, all manufacturing milk is aggregated into one product and the average 
manufacturing price is used. Over-order payments for manufacturing milk are not included in 
the model since this data is not available. Dairy farmers, or their cooperatives, are assumed to be 
price takers in the manufacturing milk market because they face nationwide competition from 
other cooperatives and proprietary milk handlers based on the MW price.
The Class I price is determined by adding the Class I differential to the Class III price for 
each marketing order. The Class I differential increases with distance from Minnesota and 
Wisconsin. The Class I differential partially reflects the cost of shipping milk from the largest 
surplus or reserve area in the United States to other orders. The Class I price is also a minimum 
price, and there are over-order payments in many markets through negotiations between dairy . 
cooperatives and proprietary milk handlers. Over-order Class I premiums are not incorporated in 
the model since they are unavailable.
There were 40 FMMOs and about 300 dairy cooperatives in the United States in 1993, 
which is the year chosen for this analysis. The model uses the same regional classification used 
by Cox, Chavas, and Jesse, who modeled the U.S. dairy market as 13 regions. All prices are 
calculated as weighted averages based on the amount of milk in each region. The California state 
order is included as a separate order in this analysis. It is assumed that cooperatives are the 
agents making milk marketing decisions in the model. Although there is more than one 
cooperative in one region, it is difficult to incorporate data on milk prices and quantities 
disaggregated to the cooperative level. Therefore, only the number of cooperatives in each 
region is considered in the model, meaning the size and all the equilibrium decisions of each 
cooperative are assumed to be the same within the region.
Because the dairy price support program (DPSP) is supposed to exist until 1999, the 
program is incorporated in this analysis. In 1993, the DPSP supported the manufacturing milk 
price at $10.00 per hundredweight (3.5 percent butterfat). The DPSP is incorporated into the 
model by requiring the government to purchase manufactured dairy products to support the
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Conceptual Model
Although Class I differentials (not including over-order payments) are mandated by the FMMO 
system, they are not guaranteed in this model. In order to estimate the degree of market-power- 
equivalent due to current FMMOs, the model simulates Class I and manufacturing milk prices 
which could be created by dairy cooperatives themselves without the FMMOs, under alternative 
assumed market structures.
Consider n (=13) regions with fluid and manufacturing milk markets. The fluid market in 
region i is called market i, and the manufacturing market in region i is called market n+i. 
Because manufactured milk is processed within each region and is not shipped outside the region 
as bulk milk, we only consider the transportation costs for interregional raw milk shipments for 
fluid processing. Since the manufactured products market is nationwide, dairy cooperatives are 
assumed to be price takers with respect to manufacturing milk marketing. It is assumed that the 
manufacturing milk price for each region is given as a uniform national price reflecting 
nationwide demand and supply conditions of the manufacturing milk market. In order to 
determine equilibrium manufacturing milk price, a downward-sloping national demand function 
for manufacturing milk is incorporated into the model.
The focus of this paper is on dairy cooperative market-power-equivalent due to the 
existence of FMMOs. To simplify the model, it is assumed that fluid milk processors have no 
market power in buying milk from cooperatives. This assumption is reasonable since there are 
many fluid processors in the U.S. It is also assumed that each region has a linear marginal raw 
milk cost function and a linear fluid demand function, with all functions known by all 
cooperatives (or consignment sellers), and that the size and all the equilibrium decisions of each 
cooperative are the same within each region.
It is assumed that milk producers in region i consign their annual milk supply to 
cooperatives in region i. Each cooperative’s role is to allocate farmers’ raw milk among the n 
fluid markets (1 to n) and the manufacturing market (n+i) in region i to maximize sales revenues 
net of transportation costs. Farmers are paid a blend price (weighted average price for milk sold 
in the fluid and manufacturing milk markets) and are assumed to be price takers who produce
manufacturing grade milk price at $10.00 per hundredweight.
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milk based on the level of the blend price. The following notation is used for the variables 
described above:
N,: the number of cooperatives in region i (i=l, 2 , n),
Dji quantity of milk demanded in fluid market j (j=l, 2, n),
Dm: quantity of milk demanded in the national manufacturing milk market,
FS;: quantity of raw milk supplied and consigned in region i (i=l, 2, n),
PS,: marginal revenue net of transportation costs for each market for region i (i=l, 2,
n ),
Xjj: quantity of raw milk shipped from region i to fluid market j (i=l, 2, n; j= l, 2, 
n),
Xi(n+i): quantity of raw milk shipped from region i to the manufacturing milk market n+i 
(i= l,2 , n ) ,
N,
Xjj(k): the portion of Xy shipped by cooperative k in region i, where X tj = ^  X (j ( k ) ,
' k = 1 '
Xj(n+i)(k): the portion of Xi(n+i) shipped by cooperative k in region i, where
Ni
^ i ( H + i )  ^  j ^ i ( n + i )  (^) ’
A =  1
PD,: demand price in fluid market j (j=l, 2 , n),
PD'n: demand price in the national manufacturing market,
BP;: producer’s pooled (blend) price in region i (i=l, 2,..., n),
Pccc: support price for manufacturing milk,
Dpai-pjPDj: demand function in fluid market j (j=l, 2,..., n),
Dm=a"'-p"'PD"’: demand function in the national manufacturing market,
FSj= -Vj+riiBPj-. marginal cost function for raw milk in region i (i=l, 2,..., n),
Ty: unit transportation cost of shipping raw milk from region i to fluid market j (i=l, 2,..., 
n ; j= l ,2 , ..., n),
R,: total milk sales revenue net of transportation costs in region i (i=l, 2,..., n).
Using the above notation, the total milk sales revenue maximization problem, net of 
transportation costs, aggregated for all regions can be expressed as:
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/=i /=l i=i /=i /=i i=i
When cooperative k in region i believes that a change in their fluid supply will cause a change in 
all other cooperatives’ fluid supply to market j, the cooperative’s “perceived” marginal fluid 
revenue in market j is:
d i P D ^ - i k ) )  1
(2) dX (k) ' = PD' + N;),
where r;j(k) is the conjectural variation of cooperative k in region i with respect to changes in all 
other cooperatives’ fluid supply to market j .
As the size and all the equilibrium decisions of each cooperative are assumed to be the 
same within each region, equation (2), in equilibrium, can be rewritten as:
d(PDjXij(k)) i
(3> - ^ r = PD’ ~ p- (^ +1) N;
(k=l, 2,..., Nj),
where r^  is the common conjectural variation of the region i cooperative.
Using the relationship expressed in (3), the total revenue maximization problem for all 
regions can be re-specified as the following net social payoff maximization problem (ANSP) 
adjusted for imperfectly competitive markets:
(4) Max: ANSP =
II
Zf
7=1
a . 1
—  -  —  D,
p./ p , '
x,,dx,, V V / ;x,
7=1 ;=i P / iV//=l 7=1 i=i
(5) s.t. for all j,
/ = I
(6)
(V)
Z ^ 7 + ^ ( - ) < FSi’ foralH’
7=1
D: > 0, Xjj > 0, Xj(11+i) > 0 for all i and j .
II n l |
When the market is perfectly competitive (r,j = -1), the term
7=1 i=l P/
zero and (4) is equal to the original Takayama and Judge model.
Using the Lagrange function (L) with the multipliers X- and 0, for the constraints (5) and
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(6), respectively, the Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for the maximization problem can be 
expressed as:
( 8)
(9)
( 10) 
( 11) 
( 12)
dL a. 1 dL
-----= -X,  < 0, D, - —  0, for all j,
dDj py p; ' ' ' dD/ J
dL X „ dL
dx.. "pT(^  + 1) + ^  _ e ' ~ a r “  = ° ’ fora111311(1 j ’
T
= PD"1 -  0, < 0, X i(ll+i) — -----= 0, for all i,
dX
dL
dX,
dL
= D, -  y  X u <0,X,----= 0, for all j,
dX; ' ‘ J dXj J
- § -  = i X * + X, .....-  FS, £ « , e , ^ - « ,  for all 1.
The Lagrange multipliers, Lj and 0i5 measure the fluid demand price (PDj), and 
“perceived” marginal revenue net of transportation costs for each market (PSj), respectively. The 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions represented by (9) and (10) indicate that each cooperative must equalize 
marginal revenue, net of transportation costs, across all fluid markets where it sells milk to the 
manufacturing milk price (if it sells milk to the manufacturing milk market). That is:
(13) PDj - y i r y  + l ) ^ - T y =  P D"‘, if Xy > 0, and Xi(n+i) >0, for all i and j.
The equilibrium values can be calculated by the quadratic programming model solution.
To complete the model, farmers’ milk supply functions need to be incorporated. 
Producers in region i, as price takers, determine their supply based on the producer blend price. 
Specifically, milk production levels are determined by equating marginal cost and the blend
price, i.e:,
(14) B P - i  for alii,
(15) FS; = -Vj + riiBPj for alii.
In the comparative-static equilibrium, FSj in (15) must be equal to FSj given in the above milk 
sales maximization problem. Equilibrium values for FSj can be found by continuing an iterative
solution process until values for FSj become stationary, as was done by Kawaguchi, Suzuki, and 
Kaiser in their Japanese milk market model.
To reach equilibrium, the national manufacturing milk demand function needs to be 
incorporated. In equilibrium, the manufacturing milk price (PDm) for each cooperative in the 
above sales maximization problem must satisfy the condition that the sum of milk shipped to
tl
manufacturing milk market n+i, or ^  X i(n+j) , must be equal to manufacturing milk demand, Dm.
>=i
If the equilibrium value of PDm is larger than the support price level (Pccc), then the following 
equations must be satisfied:
(16) =D”./ = 1
(17) Dm=am-pmPDm, if market-clearing PDm>Pccc.
n
Equilibrium values for ^  Ar#.(fI+0 and PDin are found by continuing a similar iteration procedure
/=i
n
until ^  ^ ,(„+,) becomes approximately equal to Dm. On the other hand, if the equilibrium value
i=\
for PDm is below Pccc, then PDm is replaced by Pccc, and the CCC purchases in raw milk
n
equivalents will be given as X j(n+f) - D'n.
/=i
An Application of the Model to the U. S. Milk Market
The data set used in this analysis comes from several sources, including Cox, Chavas, and Jesse; 
Suzuki and Kaiser; and USDA’s Dairy Market Statistics and Federal Milk Order Market 
Statistics. Based on Cox, Chavas, and Jesse, the 13 regions include: North East (NE), Middle 
Atlantic (MA), South Atlantic (SA), South East (SE), Central (C), East South Central (ESC), 
West South Central (WSC), East North Central (ENC), Upper Midwest (UM), West Central 
(WC), North West (NW), Mountain (MOU), and California (CA). Table 1 shows how FMMOs 
in 1993 were included in the 13 regions. The number of cooperatives in region i (Nj) is estimated 
using data from Hoard’s Dairyman, May 10, 1994. For 1993, N,=8 in NE, N2=91 in MA, N3=8 
in SA, N4=12 in SE, Ns=5 in C, N6=3 in ESC, N7=10 in WSC, Ng=57 in ENC, N9=63 in UM,
- 8 -
-9 -
N10=16 in WC, Nn=7 inNW, Nl2=13 in MOU, andNl3=16 in CA.
Table 2 shows the data set used in this analysis. Prices (3.5 percent butterfat) are 
weighted averages calculated using the FMMO data (except for California), and milk quantity 
data includes not only order milk, but also other source milk. Based on supply elasticities for the 
13 regions from Cox, Chavas, and Jesse, the regional price and quantity observations in Table 2, 
and the application of a national fluid demand price elasticity estimated by Suzuki and Kaiser (­
0.158) to all regions, the linear marginal cost and fluid milk demand functions for each region 
are:
(18) FS, = 3206.88 + 92.31BP,, D, = 3360.52 -30.86PD,,
(19) FS2 = 8442.72 + 999.64BP2, D2 = 9569.71 - 88.70PD2,
(20) FS, = 3369.54 + 29.47BP3, D3 = 3571.27 - 33.13PD3,
(21) FS4 = 2066.05 + 259.78BP4, D4 = 7515.42-67.02PD4,
(22) FS5 = -1782.88 +423.12BP5, D5 = 2179.36 -20.88PD5,
(23) FS6= 1254.74+ 117.88BP6, D6 = 3354.73 - 30.66PD6,
(24) FS7 = 3109.76+ 498.74BP7, D7 = 5508.61 - 51.30PD7,
(25) FS8= 147.50 + 1140.82BP8, D8 = 9445.81 - 95.04PD8,
(26) FS9 = 29984.60 + 440.95BP9, D9 = 2698.14-28.45PD9,
(27) FS,0= -3910.28 + 1028.72BP10, D,0=3040.91 - 31.17PD10,
(28) FS„= 4700.64 + 423.66BP,,, D„= 2217.57 -22.43PD,,,
(29) FSI2=2864.16+ 190.02BP12, D,2= 2833.63 -27.62PDn,
(30) FS13=15109.38 + 679.79BP13, D13=7573.32 - 81.62PD]3,
where FSj and D, are measured in million pounds, and BP( and PDj are measured in dollars per 
hundredweight.
Using the U.S. total and average data in Table 2, Class I percentage (43.1percent) 
reported in Federal Milk Order Market Statistics, and a national manufacturing milk demand 
elasticity estimated by Suzuki and Kaiser (-0.217), the national manufacturing milk demand 
function is specified as:
(31) Dm=l 15724.53 - 1733.22PDm.
The estimated national average manufacturing milk price was $11.91/cwt (3.5 percent butterfat) 
in 1993.
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Unit transportation costs for raw milk, T ,^ are taken from Cox, Chavas, and Jesse and are 
shown in Table 3. Note that the transportation cost matrix is asymmetric, or T(j is not necessarily 
the same as T^ .
Results
The model was solved for three forms of market structure: perfect competition, monopoly, and 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, where a cooperative believes other cooperatives will not change their 
supply in response to its actions. These results were compared to actual observations for 1993. 
Since the simulated results do not include FMMOs, the simulated market structure closest to the 
actual observations provides a measure of the impact of FMMOs on market structure.
Perfect Competition Equilibrium
Perfect competition means all cooperatives do not consider price changes caused by 
supply changes, or each cooperative in region i recognizes its marginal revenue in fluid market j 
as:
(32)
d(PDjX0(k)) 
dXJk )
= PD.
Tables 4 to 6 summarize the results. Compared with actual observations, the perfect 
competition solution resulted in lower Class I milk prices, higher manufacturing milk prices, and 
more milk going into fluid markets. The manufacturing milk price, under perfect competition, 
was $12.61 per hundredweight, while the actual manufacturing milk price was $11.91 in 1993. 
Except in two Class I-deficit regions, the Class I differential disappeared. Compared with actual 
observations, blend prices were slightly lower in most regions due to the absence of Class I 
differentials (the simulated U.S. average was $12.70, while the actual average was $12.89). 
However, the difference in regional blend prices between the perfect competition solution and 
actual observations was relatively small because the higher simulated manufacturing prices offset 
the lower simulated Class I prices. Because blend prices are, on average, lower under perfect 
competition, simulated U.S. milk production was slightly lower than the actual observation level.
To satisfy Class I deficit markets, there were some interregional Class I milk shipments 
under perfect competition. In this case, interregional milk movements occurred only from C to
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SE and ESC. The SE and ESC regions did not have enough milk production to meet their fluid 
demand, and the nearest reserve area to these regions was C.
Monopoly Equilibrium
Under monopoly, it is assumed that cooperatives jointly recognize their marginal revenue 
in fluid market j as:
Compared to the perfect competition condition (32), condition (33) implies that increasing milk 
shipments to market j reduces milk prices and marginal revenue to each cooperative in any 
region.
The monopoly solution, in general, resulted in unrealistic price and quantity levels 
compared with actual 1993 observations (see Tables 4 to 6). For instance, the simulated Class I 
milk supply under monopoly was only one-half of the actual level. The huge reduction in Class I 
milk supply resulted in unrealistically high Class I prices ($50 to $60 per hundredweight). While 
the Class I milk supply was reduced, there was a huge increase in milk going into manufactured 
products. In fact, the monopoly solution resulted in a surplus of 52 billion pounds of milk being 
bought by the government under the DPSP—substantially higher than the 6.5 billion pounds the 
government actually purchased in 1993. The huge surplus of manufacturing milk caused the 
manufacturing milk price to be at the $10 support level. The national average blend price was 
$17.42, which was substantially higher than the actual $12.89 level in 1993. Interestingly, 
although monopolies usually result in the least production, total milk supply in the monopoly 
equilibrium was significantly higher than in the perfect competition solution (30 billion pounds, 
or 29 percent higher). This was due to the result that blend prices were substantially higher in 
the monopoly case and cooperatives had no power to control supply. The huge divergence 
between simulated and actual prices and quantities suggests current minimum Class I 
differentials under the FMMO system are far from the monopoly levels.
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Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
In the Cournot-Nash case, cooperatives consider price changes caused only by their own 
supply changes. That is, “perceived” marginal revenue of each cooperative in region i in fluid 
market j is expressed as:
(34)
d(PD jX 0(k)) _ J _ X jL 
dx tJ{k) ' P, N, •
Compared to the other market structures, the Class I price, Class I differential, and 
manufacturing milk price, as well as total milk supply and demand in the Cournot-Nash solution 
were the closest to actual 1993 observations (Tables 4 to 6). For example, the simulated average 
Class I differential for the United States was $2.22 compared to $2.28, which was the differential 
in 1993. Compared with actual observations, the Cournot-Nash solution resulted in slightly 
lower Class I milk prices, higher manufacturing milk prices, and more milk going into fluid 
markets. The manufacturing milk price, under the Cournot-Nash solution, was $12.07 per 
hundredweight, while the actual manufacturing milk price was $11.91 in 1993. Similar to the 
perfect competition solution, the simulated blend prices were slightly lower than actual 
observations in most regions (the simulated U.S. average was $12.61, while the actual average 
was $12.89). Because blend prices were, on average, lower under Cournot-Nash, simulated U.S. 
milk production was slightly lower than the actual observation level.
Comparison o f Conjectural Variations among Scenarios .
In the monopoly case, values for r(i were calculated as:
v 2 X ,  „
(35) r„ = — =!------- 1 = N , -  l.(v X„ = 2 > „  in practice).
A il V=1
For example, the conjectural variation of a cooperative in region 1 regarding market 1 was 7. On 
the other hand, all r s^ were -1 in perfect competition, or price taking behavior, and 0 in the 
Cournot-Nash case. These values implied the degree of market-power-equivalent given to dairy 
cooperatives by current federal orders was far from monopoly and closer to perfect competition.
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Conclusions
A spatial equilibrium model that allows for the inclusion of any degree of market structure from 
perfect competition to monopoly was developed and applied to the U.S. dairy sector. The model 
was used to investigate the impact of milk marketing orders on market structure by simulating 
possible Class I and manufacturing milk prices which could be created by dairy cooperatives 
without the FMMO system, under alternative assumed market structures. The simulation results 
were then compared with current regional milk prices under the FMMO system to gain insight on 
the impact of orders on market structure.
It was clear from the results that the current FMMO system does not create much 
monopoly power for dairy cooperatives. The simulated prices and quantities for the monopoly 
solution were substantially different from actual observations. On the other hand, the simulation 
prices and quantities assuming Cournot-Nash behavior were the most similar to actual 
observations. While not as close as the Cournot-Nash solution, the results of the perfect 
competition solution simulation were also fairly similar to actual observations. These results 
suggest FMMOs have had a moderate impact on market structure approximately equivalent to 
some degree of imperfect competition relatively close to perfect competition.
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Table 1. The Federal Milk Marketing Orders Included in the 13 Regions in 1993.
Region
1 NE
2 MA
3 SA
4 SE
5 C
6 ESC
7 WSC
8 ENC
9 UM
10 WC
11 NW 
12MOU
13 CA
Marketing Orders Included
New England
New York-New Jersey, Middle Atlantic 
Carolina
Georgia, Upper Florida, Tampa Bay, Southeastern Florida
Tennessee Valley, Nashville, Paducah, Memphis
Central Arkansas, Greater Louisiana, New Orleans-Mississippi,
Alabama-West Florida 
Southwest Plains, Texas
Michigan Upper Peninsula, Southern Michigan, Eastern Ohio-Western 
Pennsylvania, Ohio Valley, Indiana, Central Illinois, Southern Illinois-Eastern 
Missouri, Louisville-Lexington-Evansville 
Chicago Regional, Upper Midwest
Iowa, Nebraska-Western Iowa, Kansas City, Eastern South Dakota, Black Hills
Pacific Northwest, Southwestern Idaho-Eastern Oregon
Eastern Colorado, Western Colorado, Great Basin, Central Arizona, New
Mexico-West Texas
(California)
Table 2. Data Set for the Analysis (1993).
Region FMMO
Blend
Price
FMMO 
Class I 
Price
Class I 
Differential
Milk
Production
Milk
Supply
Elasticity
Fluid
Demand
$/cwt $/cwt $/cwt Million Million
Pounds Pounds
1 NE 13.51 14.86 2.65 4,454 0.28 2,902
2 MA 13.21 14.72 2.60 21,648 0.61 8,264
3 SA 14.13 14.71 2.72 3,786 0.11 3,084
4 SE 14.77 15.30 2.86 5,903 0.65 6,490
5 C 13.79 14.24 2.34 4,052 1.44 1,882
6 ESC 14.11 14.93 2.98 2,918 0.57 2,897
7 WSC 13.25 14.65 2.65 9,718 0.68 4,757
8 ENC 12.80 13.56 1.63 14,750 0.99 8,157
9 UM 12.00 12.94 1.16 35,276 0.15 2,330
10 WC 12.44 13.31 1.36 8,887 1.44 2,626
11 NW 12.02 13.49 2.12 9,793 0.52 1,915
12MOU 12.84 14.00 2.06 5,304 0.46 2,447
13 CA 11.45 12.66 1.70 22,893 0.34 6,540
Average/Total 12.89 14.19 2.28 149,382 NA 54,292
Note: Prices, except for California, are weighted averages calculated using USDA/AMS’s Dairy 
Market Statistics and Federal Milk Order Market Statistics. Quantities, supply elasticities, and prices 
for California are from Cox, Chavas, and Jesse.
Table 3. Interregional Unit Transportation Costs ($/cwt).
To:
From
NE
1
MA
2
SA
3
SE
4
C
5
ESC
6
WSC
7
ENC
8
UM
9
WC
10
NW
11
MOU
12
CA
13
NE 0.00 1.07 2.08 3.47 3.89 5.00 5.55 3.57 4.02 4.58 8.15 6.54 8.16
MA 1.00 0.00 1.13 2.88 3.19 4.17 4.93 2.81 3.41 3.94 7.54 5.95 7.55
SA 1.96 1.13 0.00 2.18 2.36 3.36 4.19 2.27 2.91 3.43 7.20 5.59 7.20
SE 3.07 2.53 1.92 0.00 2.26 2.06 3.03 2.80 3.73 3.75 7.60 5.89 7.06
C 2.68 2.28 1.69 1.65 0.00 1.40 2.02 1.28 2.04 2.26 6.02 4.29 5.86
ESC 3.70 3.22 2.60 1.71 2.26 0.00 1.33 2.26 2.88 2.40 6.23 4.39 5.50
WSC 4.44 4.13 3.51 2.75 2.16 1.62 0.00 3.03 3.59 1.93 5.08 3.29 4.33
ENC 2.59 2.18 1.71 1.95 0.93 1.65 2.65 0.00 1.47 2.12 5.59 4.06 5.52
UM 2.58 2.27 1.94 2.49 1.48 2.29 3.04 1.32 0.00 2.18 5.05 3.84 5.32
WC 3.42 3.06 2.67 2.58 1.92 1.65 1.50 1.91 1.95 0.00 4.54 2.93 4.49
NW 7.96 7.62 7.27 7.43 6.21 6.67 5.68 6.26 5.74 5.16 0.00 2.36 1.81
MOU 6.02 5.67 5.32 6.31 4.81 4.94 4.08 4.29 4.36 3.21 2.42 0.00 2.22
CA 7.98 7.63 5.54 7.01 6.17 5.75 4.95 6.35 6.21 5.24 1.74 2.08 0.00
Source: Cox, Chavas, and Jesse.
Table 4. Comparison of Blend Prices and Manufacturing Prices in each Case with Observations.
Blend Price ($/cwt) 
Region Actual Perfect
C om p etition
Difference Monopoly Difference Coumot-
Nash
Difference
1 NE 13.51 12.61 0.90 17.78 -4.27 12.27 1.24
2 MA 13.21 12.61 0.60 17.69 -4.48 12.67 0.54
3 SA 14.13 12.61 1.52 17.56 -3.43 12.35 1.78
4 SE 14.77 14.26 0.51 19.12 -4.35 13.13 1.64
5 C 13.79 12.61 1.18 17.47 -3.68 12.41 1.38
6 ESC 14.11 14.01 0.10 18.87 -4.76 12.51 1.60
7 WSC 13.25 12.61 0.64 17.57 -4.32 12.62 0.63
8 ENC 12.80 12.61 0.19 17.50 -4.70 13.11 -0.31
9 UM 12.00 12.61 -0.61 17.35 -5.35 12.17 -0.17
10 WC 12.44 12.61 -0.17 17.52 -5.08 12.67 -0.23
11 NW 12.02 12.61 -0.59 16.94 -4.92 12.47 -0.45
12MOU 12.84 12.61 0.23 17.51 -4.67 13.24 -0.40
13 CA 11.45 12.61 -1.16 16.53 -5.08 12.78 -1.33
Average 12.89 12.70 0.19 17.42 -4.53 12.61 0.28
Manufacturing Milk Price ($/cwt)
Actual Perfect Difference Monopoly Difference Cournot- Difference
C om p etition Nash
Average 11.91 12.61 -0.70 10.00 1.91 12.07 -0.16
Table 5. Comparison of Class I Prices and Class I Differentials in each Case with Observations.
Class I Price ($/cwt) 
Region Actual Perfect Difference 
C om p etition
Monopoly Difference Coumot-
Nash
Difference
1 NE 14.86 12.61 2.25 59.46 -44.60 13.95 0.91
2 MA 14.72 12.61 2.11 58.94 -44.22 13.11 1.61
3 SA 14.71 12.61 2.10 58.91 -44.20 13.95 0.76
4 SE 15.30 14.26 1.04 61.07 -45.77 14.74 0.56
5 C 14.24 12.61 1.63 57.18 -42.94 13.96 0.28
6 ESC 14.93 14.01 0.92 59.71 -44.78 14.53 0.40
7 WSC 14.65 12.61 2.04 58.69 -44.04 15.14 -0.49
8 ENC 13.56 12.61 0.95 54.69 -41.13 13.47 0.09
9 UM 12.94 12.61 0.33 52.42 -39.48 13.36 -0.42
10 w c 13.31 12.61 0.70 53.78 -40.47 14.53 -1.22
11 NW 13.49 12.61 0.88 54.43 -40.94 16.02 -2.53
12MOU 14.00 12.61 1.39 56.30 -42.30 15.56 -1.56
13 CA 12.66 12.61 0.05 51.39 -38.73 15.37 -2.71
Average 14.19 12.88 1.31 56.85 -42.66 14.29 -0.10
Class I Differential ($/cwt)
Region Actual Perfect
C om p etition
Difference Monopoly Difference Coumot-
Nash
Difference
1 NE 2.65 0 2.65 49.46 -46.81 1.88 0.77
2 MA 2.60 0 2.60 48.94 -46.34 1.04 1.56
3 SA 2.72 0 2.72 48.91 -46.19 1.88 0.84
4 SE 2.86 1.65 1.21 51.07 -48.21 2.67 0.19
5 C 2.34 0 2.34 47.18 -44.84 1.89 0.45
6 ESC 2.98 1.40 1.58 49.71 -46.73 2.46 0.52
7 WSC 2.65 0 2.65 48.69 -46.04 3.07 -0.42
8 ENC 1.63 0 1.63 44.69 -43.06 1.40 0.23
9 UM 1.16 0 1.16 42.42 -41.26 1.29 -0.13
10 WC 1.36 0 1.36 43.78 -42.42 2.46 -1.10
11 NW 2.12 0 2.12 44.43 -42.31 3.95 -1.83
12MOU 2.06 0 2.06 46.30 -44.24 3.49 -1.43
13 CA 1.70 0 1.70 41.39 -39.69 3.30 -1.60
Average 2.28 0.27 2.01 46.85 -44.57 2.22 0.06
Table 6. Comparison of Milk Supply and Class I Demand in each Case with Observations.
Milk Supply (Million Pounds) 
Region Actual Perfect
C om p etition
Difference Monopoly Difference Coumot-
Nash
Difference
1 NE 4,454 4,371 83 4,848 -394 4,340 114
2 MA 21,648 21,048 600 26,129 -4,481 21,106 542
3 SA 3,786 3,741 45 3,887 -101 3,734 52
4 SE 5,903 5,771 132 7,034 -1,131 5,476 427
5 C 4,052 3,553 499 5,610 -1,558 3,470 582
6 ESC 2,918 2,906 12 3,479 -561 2,730 188
7 WSC 9,718 9,399 319 11,874 -2,156 9,402 316
8 ENC 14,750 14,533 217 20,114 -5,364 15,100 -350
9 UM 35,276 35,545 -269 37,636 -2,360 35,352 -76
10 WC 8,887 9,062 -175 14,115 -5,228 9,127 -240
11 NW 9,793 10,043 -250 11,878 -2,085 9,983 -190
12MOU 5,304 5,260 44 6,192 -888 5,381 -77
13 CA 22,893 23,682 -789 26,348 -3,455 23,797 -904
Total 149,382 148,914 468 179,146 -29,764 148,995 387
Class I Demand (Million Pounds) 
Region Actual Perfect
C om p etition
Difference Monopoly Difference Coumot-
Nash
Difference
1 NE 2,902 2,971 -69 1,526 1,376 2,930 -28
2 MA 8,264 8,451 -187 4,341 3,923 8,407 -143
3 SA 3,084 3,154 -70 1,620 1,464 3,109 -25
4 SE 6,490 6,560 -70 3,423 3,067 6,528 -38
5 C 1,882 1,916 -34 985 897 1,888 -6
6 ESC 2,897 2,925 -28 1,524 1,373 2,909 -12
7 WSC 4,757 4,862 -105 2,498 2,259 4,732 25
8 ENC 8,157 8,247 -90 4,248 3,909 8,165 -8
9 UM 2,330 2,339 -9 1,207 1,123 2,318 12
10 WC 2,626 2,648 -22 1,365 1,261 2,588 38
11 NW 1,915 1,935 -20 997 918 1,858 57
12MOU 2,447 2,485 -38 1,279 1,168 2,404 43
13 CA 6,540 6,544 -4 3,379 3,161 6,318 222
Total 54,292 55,038 -746 28,390 25,902 54,155 137
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